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User participation during software projects has long been considered a prerequisite for system success, and yet these initiatives
continue to be rife with troubles. This is particularly true of enterprise software such as ERP and CRM, which, in spite of its
popularity, is difficult to implement and is prone to user resistance. This, then, begs the question of why these enterprise systems
run into problems even with when garnering user participation. One response may be to question the importance of participation
per se; a more considered response is likely to be one that emphasizes the need to more closely explore the relationship between
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two ES projects. Through the theoretical lens of 'situated learning’, we argue that pre-implementation user participation can be
problematic so that post-implementation involvement will be more effective in garnering user interest and assistance.
Keywords:
ERP, Enterprise Systems, participatory design, user involvement, user participation, implementation, post
implementation

* This is a part of the special issue on Enid Mumford’s contribution to information systems theory and theoretical thinking. Jaana
Porra and Rudy Hirschheim were the accepting guest editors.

Volume 8, Issue 10, Article 1, pp. 508-524, October 2007

Volume 8

Issue 10

Article 1

Exploring the Importance of Participation in the Post-Implementation Period of an ES Project:
A Neglected Area

Introduction
The software development market today is dominated by off-the-shelf software ‘solutions’. This is different from the past,
when customized, in-house developments were the norm. This change has lead some to argue that the systems
development life cycle needs updating (Markus and Tanis, 2000) to reflect what is actually happening in practice. A key
component of this shift will necessarily involve an examination of the role and timing of user participation efforts over the
lifecycle of a packaged information system. For example, Sawyer (2001) evaluates the ‘waterfall’ or stage-model of
traditional information systems (IS) development in the context of purchasing packaged software. He notes that end users
are less likely to be involved in the early lifecycle phases when an organization purchases software because of the more
significant costs involved and the need to work with third party intermediaries. Sawyer states, “It is only during installation
that users become deeply involved for the first time in assessing how the software meets their needs“ (ibid; 100). However,
research to-date has not explored the implications of this change in the timing of user participation within the context of
packaged software development and use.
We are not questioning the importance of user participation. Indeed, participation has been described as ‘institutionalized
practice’ (Howcroft and Wilson, 2003) so ubiquitous is its emphasis within the IS literature, dating back to the early work of
the Tavistock Institute, generally, and of Enid Mumford, specifically (the focus of this special issue). Thus, we accept
Mumford’s assumption that it is important to create IS that take account of people’s social as well as technical needs and
that user participation is necessary to achieve this (Mumford, 1983b). Our objective is to consider how this can be realized
in the context of packaged software when users cannot actually be involved in software design, precisely because the design
is relatively fixed by the package. Thus, historically early user participation was considered necessary in order to specify the
system requirements; after all, the system was being specifically designed for a particular group of users. However, today’s
off-the-shelf packages come embedded with ‘best practices, which vendors and consultants encourage to adopt rather than
change to follow their existing practices. This raises questions about the importance and usefulness of user participation in
the early stages of an IS project given that the system design is pre-specified and non-negotiable, at least if the adopting
organization wants to follow vendor advice and implement the vanilla system.
In this paper we consider user participation in the context of Enterprise Systems (ES), particularly Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM). These packaged systems should be simpler to implement
compared to tailor-made IS given that they merely need to be ‘configured’ rather than designed from scratch. However,
research has identified that companies struggle with their ES implementations, facing user resistance and running
significantly over budget or time-lines (e.g., Wagner and Newell, 2004; Sauer et al., 2001; Scott and Vessey, 2002), even
when users participate in these projects in a variety of capacities (e.g., Parr and Shanks, 2000; Robey et al., 2002). This,
then, begs the question of why these ES run into problems even with user participation? One response may be to question
the importance of participation per se; a more considered response emphasizes the need to more closely explore the
relationship between participation and IS success. Markus and Mao (2004) begin unpacking this relationship, highlighting
the need for a more refined exploration of both ‘participation’ and ‘IS success’ and consideration of the particular context.
We respond to this call for refining our understanding of participation by highlighting a dimension that appears to have
been ignored in the past – the timing of participation in the context of large and complex ES implementations.
We address the following research questions: How do packaged solutions change the efficacy of user participation over the
ES experience lifecycle? How does post-implementation user participation improve the acceptance of an ES? We do so by
drawing upon the theoretical lens of situated learning and data from two qualitative case studies. Our work makes three
contributions. First, it introduces the idea of post-implementation user participation as a normal and necessary part of
systems development. Second, it documents the changing nature of software development and design and updates the
discourse to reflect the dominant paradigm of purchasing off-the-shelf packages. Third, it highlights an inconsistency
between a ‘best practice’ rhetoric as espoused by software vendors and the reality of post-implementation changes that
occur in practice. Section one covers the relevant background literature. This is followed by the methodology section and
the case descriptions. We then analyze and we draw conclusions in the final section.

Background Literature
In the 1980s and 1990s efforts were made in relation to participative approaches in large part due to problematic IS
development methodologies that didn't accurately model the real world (Land, 1982) and relied upon the identification of
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known requirements (Valusek and Fryback, 1985). This resulted in dissatisfied users who first experienced the IS at
installation when it was seen to be too late to make changes (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995). Research began to reveal how
complex this IS development process is, leading to the questioning of some common assumptions such as: that users know
precisely what their information needs are and can communicate these easily to system designers (Argyris, 1980); that
relationships and communication issues between user and designer are straightforward (Argyris, 1980; Oliver and Langford,
1984); and that information needs are static (Land, 1982).
Not only was user participation a response to the ”failure of conventional design but it was also based on a belief that users
have a right to design their work environment” (Dearnley and Mayhew, 1983; 37). The work of Enid Mumford specifically
emphasized the importance of participative system design. This emphasis has been accepted within the context of IS
development (Howcroft and Wilson, 2003). For Mumford (1983c) participation is defined as “those democratic processes
that enable employees to exercise control over their own work environments and work futures” (48). Her rationale was
based on evidence that “treating people as adjuncts to machines does not work” (Mumford, 1983c; 47), leaving Mumford
to conclude that involving users in design decisions will result in IS that take account of people’s social as well as technical
needs and so be more effective. This is set out in the principles of socio-technical design and incorporated in the steps of
the ETHICS methodology (Mumford and Weir, 1979; Mumford, 1995), where system development is seen as inherently
complex, requiring negotiations between different stakeholder groups. From this perspective the involvement of multiple
groups in negotiations may be more work up-front but is central to system success so that requirements can be determined
and accommodations made prior to implementation (Mumford, 1983a). This implies that users should be involved in ways
that are substantial and active, rather than ‘pseudo-participation’ where user involvement is claimed, but IT professionals
make the design decisions (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995; p 90). The literature points out varying levels of participation
(Dearnley and Mayhew, 1983; Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995; Mumford, 1983b) ranging from the consultative, where the
user is interviewed at some point in the project, to the mid-range representative approach involving user spokespeople and
analysts in the design process with both groups having a say in the decision making. The most participative approach
involves all intended user beneficiaries throughout the design process making decisions based on a consensus model
(Mumford, 1983b).
Ironically, the few studies that have focused on participation in ES project initiatives have found a degree of pseudoparticipation where the role of the end-user is limited (Kawalek and Wood-Harper, 2002) and lacking influence (Howcroft
and Light, 2006). Kawalek and Wood-Harper concluded that user participation was necessary for the project’s success but
had a particular “intelligence function” for the project manager, who needed to learn about the local environment in order
to successfully implement the ES. Participation in this case was limited to determining the essential items to be configured
into the standard package, versus those that could be handled with HR or process changes. Users did not help to shape
the IS in any significant way because the solution had already been chosen. Similarly, Howcroft and Light (2006) found that
the end-user role involved limited participation. They note that this is like going “full circle back to the early days of
customized development when users had little involvement” (234). The authors mention “the myth of user involvement”
(232) where lip-service is given to user involvement but where the actions don’t actually support it. Specifically, end-users
were broadly made aware of the project (prior to selection), but their involvement was not sought until three weeks before
the planned implementation date.
Promoted for over 20 years, prototyping is traditionally viewed as “a system that works whereas a working system is a system
that is used” (Dearnley and Mayhew, 1983; 37-8). Dearnley and Mayhew argue that the prototyping approach may be
the only way that users discover exactly what they want from the system – and what is feasible. During analysis and design,
the use of prototypes will help to create a feedback process between users and analysts. This technique encourages
planned-for “loop backs between analysis and design that is used to gain as much information as possible from users” (40).
The authors explicitly encourage early participation and suggest future research focus on the optimum time for creating the
first prototype. Thus, prototypes are developed in an iterative fashion until users are satisfied and the production system is
installed. Prototyping, however, may look rather different in the packaged software environment.
Prototyping draws our attention to how packaged IS development may be usefully seen as an iterative process— both
formal and informal— where developers and users negotiate how the IS might evolve as users learn the system in the
context of their daily ongoing activities. Using the IS in their everyday work alerts them to new ideas about how the IS can
potentially improve practice, hence in our analysis we consider participation in both the pre- and post-implementation
phases. In doing this we draw upon the situated learning perspective (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998), and its
close ally, ethnographic studies of work (see Suchman, 1987; Luff et al., 2000), which see knowledge and learning as
emergent properties, rooted in the everyday interactions between people with the artifacts that occupy work spaces (such as
IT).
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Methodology
Given that existing literature does not consider this issue of participation timing, we analyze data from two case studies in
order to identify how timing impacted the ES success in terms of exploiting the desired functionality. Our fieldwork
comprised of interviews with key participants regarding their project experiences and systematic review of official project
documentation.
Following Walsham (1993), the cases are designed to seek “validity…not [from] the representativeness of the case in a
statistical sense, but on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used in describing the results and in drawing
conclusions from them” (p 15). We used interpretive research techniques to gather, interpret, and analyze field data
(Walsham, 1993; Klein and Myers, 1999). The paper’s findings are based on the comparative analysis of user
participation within each case as well as a cross-case analysis. Each author separately conducted the fieldwork related to
one of the two cases. In neither case was the initial research focus specifically on the timing of user participation; rather this
issue emerged as the authors discussed insights from their respective cases. This subsequently led us to analyze each case in
terms of this important, emergent issue.
One case focused on the process by which a workable ERP system was created within the administration of a prestigious
U.S. university— ABC.1 ABC provided a rich and appropriate research setting for two main reasons. First, the objective of
the ERP implementation was to improve work practices for ABC’s user community. Second, ABC leaders and external
consultants took seriously the participation of users throughout the project. The second case focused on the implementation
of a CRM system across the global business of a large consulting firm, XYZ, which was trying to meet the needs of
thousands of geographically and functionally dispersed users. Given the complex structuring of work, this case enabled us
to compare the nature of user participation within a differently structured organization. In addition, those interviewed at XYZ
had personal and professional experiences with many ES implementations. Not only were the interviewees able to reflect
upon their experiences with the XYZ project, they did so in light of their consulting experiences on other ES projects.
Furthermore, XYZ provided the ES methodology they were following, which explicitly includes a user participation emphasis.
Collecting multiple forms of data helped us to seek multiple interpretations to improve the “plausibility and cogency of our
interpretive accounts” (Klein and Myers, 1999). Following Levina and Vaast (2005), we present a cross-case comparison in
the form of a table that summarizes the research methods employed in the field (Table 1).
Table 1: Cross-case comparison of research methods
Methods
Field work
Timing
Narrative
interviews
Field journal
Documentation
Follow-up
contact

ABC
4 visits each lasting 8 weeks over a
period of 18 months
Implementation
and
postimplementation
129 with 53 stakeholders.
Recorded and verbatim transcriptions
Pre and post interview notes and
observations, transcribed
Yes
Yes

XYZ
Interviews over 6 months
Implementation and post-implementation
15 in US, 1 in UK
Recorded and verbatim transcriptions
Notes taken during interview and site
visits, transcribed
Yes
No

Although the two cases were conducted separately, both researchers were informed by an interpretive epistemology,
employed the same narrative interview technique (Bauer, 1996), and focused data collection on the same unit of analysis
— specifically, an organizational implementation of an ES. Our field work resulted in different but complementary insights:
one observed the individual psychology of users who were not fully engaged in a project until the post-implementation
phase, while the other found that changing technical requirements leading to budgetary shifts meant that continuous user
participation from requirements definition through go-live was not practical or realizable. Our analysis involved fully
articulating the dynamics of each case study and then developing a shared perspective based on the themes that were
present in either one or both settings. In doing this, we were identifying when participation appeared to be more or less
successful in terms of supporting the objectives of the ES in each company. However, in terms of measuring ‘success’ we
were assuming a subjective rather than an objective epistemology (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998): we did not aim to compare
1

Company names have been anonymized as have the details of interviewees in order to protect their privacy.
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the cases in terms of “success”, as a fixed dimension, since we assumed that what counted as success was socially
constructed by those involved.
To accomplish this each researcher individually reviewed her qualitative data and constructed a case description
highlighting issues of user participation that represented our independent interpretations of the data. We shared these write
ups, along with a list of emergent themes, in order to compare the cases and consider the principles of dialogical reasoning
and suspicion in order to further improve our interpretive accounts (Klein and Myers, 1999). An iterative process of crosscase discussion and fine-tuning of the case descriptions helped us to identify an over-arching theme related to the timing of
user participation. We then organized the analytical themes around this issue, which allowed us to develop a coherent
sense of the participation across the two cases. After further developing the analytical focus, we chose the theoretical lens
of situated learning as being most effective for illuminating the issues that emerged from the analysis of case data.

Case Descriptions
Each case is organized into two episodes based on key issues related to user participation. We focus in both cases on user
participation once the IS package was selected, not on the selection phase, which does not typically include end user
involvement in the context of ES (Sawyer, 2001).

XYZ Case
XYZ is a global organization manufacturing and retailing both PC and high-end computer systems. It also has global
consultancy businesses. In 1999, senior executives decided to implement an external CRM package because of its
scalability and ability to support the breadth of XYZ, which had over 50,000 users. The project commenced in 2000, and
by 2004 several of the modules had been implemented but not across all regions, and there had been significant setbacks
with many of the modules, especially sales and marketing. Moreover, many of the legacy systems that should have been
‘sunset’ once a module went live were still in operation, being used alongside the new CRM. The core team was described
as “burnt out.”

Participation during Pre-Implementation
Each CRM module was designed and implemented by a separate project team working with sub-teams at the local
geographies for implementation at each site. There was a central project leadership team overseeing the whole initiative. A
well-defined project methodology was made explicit in a 70-page manual that included considerable emphasis on user
participation:

The user represents the field or end customer. Throughout the process the user ensures that the customer’s
requirements do not get lost among the infrastructure, coding, and financial decisions. The user validates
the deliverables and benefits, and is active in every phase.

Given the perceived importance of user participation, the project methodology specified that each CRM module had a
project development lead whose job was to focus on the user. The way that this participation was managed was to bring
user representatives together to actually look at the functionality of the CRM system and compare it to existing practice and
to challenge why this practice could not be changed. For example, with the first call center module:

The very first one we did, we literally brought 50 people in from around the world, who were real users,
and sat them in a room in [location] for two weeks. We said to them here’s how your process works, and
here’s how people might handle that process. Tell me how it works and tell me why not, and we did a
whole lot of mapping of the processes…the question we always asked was ’why can’t you use this?’ Don’t
tell me you don’t like; why can’t you use it? [Core project member E]

In this instance the users identified over 600 modifications that they wanted, but only eight of these were actually enabled in
the first release, and these related to terminology and nomenclature, since they “elected to change the people rather than
the tool.”
Users involved in the project struggled because they could not fully understand how the new practice would work while it
was still at the concept stage. It was not until the users could get a firm idea of the new system that they began to take
notice and show concern about the changes that it might force:

In terms of, ‘now this is what it’s going to look like’...[users] start thinking through a little bit more carefully
in terms of ‘this is what I’m actually going to get versus what I have today.’ Then they start to worry about
whether or not what they’re getting is in fact necessary to them or not. And they do more reflection, more
detail, and more survival to make sure that they’re not getting anything less than what they have today.
[Core project member A]
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Even when users had been involved in the configuration/customization phase, it did not necessarily translate into a system
they found useful:

Roughly one year ago we did a walk-through of the application with the same audience after the
requirements had gone in from the fit-gap and the developers had actually developed the tool. This was
enlightening for them – in some ways it worked better and in some ways worse. And we also got some
additional requirements out of this process. [Core project member C]

In the case of this first module, the project implementation team was able to ignore the customization requests of the user
representatives and force the system on the users. They were not able to do this with later modules. This was partly because
users involved in the later modules were not present at the outset, meaning that they missed out on the momentum that built
around the initiative and failed to hear much rhetoric about the project mission. As one senior member of the core project
team said:

If I were to run a project like this, the lessons I have learned about people on the project is we need to be
re-educating them on how you want the project to work; otherwise, they will reinvent it.

Thus, users in sales and marketing resisted the vanilla model. These users were more powerful and, while some of their
resistance was recognized as warranted because of the need for local customizations to support differentiating processes,
some of it was considered unnecessary:

The sales team basically stuck their tongue out and said screw you; we ain’t going to do this unless you do
it our way, which has led to a number of compromises [customizations] in how we actually implemented
the package, some of which are good, some of which aren’t good. [Core project member A]

Both the marketing and sales modules were stalled because they could not get agreement on what customizations were
essential. In this period they spent time discussing these issues, but trying to accommodate all the needs of different user
groups simply led to a stalemate. On the marketing module, the problem eventually led to the appointment of a new
project manager. He believed that trying to accommodate all the diverse needs was impossible:

Piloting and working forward I think are the absolute key ingredients because otherwise you can get a
committee working and discussing it for years and they’ll come up with something they think is absolutely
perfect and it will fall apart within two weeks of going live because there’s so much stuff they didn’t know,
or the world moved on, or you know it wasn’t supposed to be like that, you told me this field was unique,
it’s not. I thought it was. And suddenly you have all these other issues. So I think getting on and doing it
is absolutely important.

He saw this as inevitable because of the way in which people learn to use their information systems over time in ways that
were not originally envisioned or intended:

So you end up with a huge amount of different data formats and different legacy databases… the people
are doing the best they can and also using the fields for something in which it was never intended, either
because it was never really closely defined or because tactically they had to do something so they did that.

As such, he took a different tactic to move the stalled project forward. He explicitly attempted to make the new system look
as similar to the old as possible in order to gain user support. This meant building things into the new system that were not
strictly necessary,

And so they are bringing with them the legacy thinking. And some of that legacy thinking you’re just going
to have to accept even though it’s wrong. Customer numbers being an example. Even though it’s wrong.
You shouldn’t do it [try and attempt to remove them in the new system]. Basically it’s not going to get in
the way long term so let them keep [it] and then you can just move [the project] along. Otherwise you can
just get bogged down in some really big debates and a lot of teams do that.

Participation during Post-Implementation
With this revised approach to configuration/customization, a new marketing module was eventually rolled out. By explicitly
focusing on accommodating users’ traditional practices, the power of the CRM was not fully exploited at installation.
However, over time, and with practice users learned to utilize what they had been given, sharing this knowledge across their
group:

People are very good at exploiting; that’s people’s nature when they discover that, for example, there’s a
button there and they press it and it actually does something which they couldn’t do before, and they say,
‘You know this button works’. And you go, ‘Yes, yes it does work. It’s been there all along and you’ve
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now discovered something’…And you don’t have to educate people.
[Marketing module project manager]

It just spreads like wildfire.

Through this experiential learning, users also came to understand what could and could not be done with the software,
leading them to make requests for customizations that would improve their practice:

Sometimes people ask for a particular feature…‘if we had this, we could do a lot’. And they wait for
it…and eventually six months later they finally get it and they test it and…zoom straight afterward it makes
the [work] change. So I think the deploying of the enterprise system really is the enabler to massive
change...What happens is you go through this cyclic thing…. [Marketing module project manager]

This exploitation process in the post-implementation environment, however, was not done systematically – the methodology
did not cover this phase but rather assumed that the process was ended once the IS was installed. Thus, there was no
formal process to engage users systematically in this period; the learning through practice was ad-hoc. This led to some of
the project team stressing the importance of getting the configuration/customization ‘right’ initially:

You know I compare it to having a house built…no matter how much planning you do and all the right
intentions you go in with a limited dollar amount and a limited amount of patience. There are many things
that you say I’m going to go back after I build a house because either I can’t afford it or it’s not the right
time or I haven’t made a decision properly...most of the time you don’t go back and you don’t make those
changes…Very, very similar with SAP implementations. Which is why we try as much as possible to stress
the importance of ‘you need to do it now’. [Core project member B].

ABC Case
ABC is a prestigious U.S. university comprising an undergraduate college, graduate and professional schools. The
university as a whole is administered centrally by a large staff housed in functional units. These staff gather information
from academic departments through various legacy systems and then reconcile the results in order to report data on a
quarterly basis. In 1996, the university leadership chose to develop and implement an ERP package in partnership with a
multinational software vendor in order to integrate their loosely coupled structure by reducing the administrative autonomy
that existed in the departments. The project commenced in late 1996 and by summer 2000 the entire suite had been
implemented across the university; however, the academic constituencies were refusing to work with the financial
management module.

Participation during Pre-Implementation
A great deal of care was taken to select a representative project team. Guided by the ERP vendor’s methodology and with
expert guidance from a multinational management consulting firm, a matrix project structure was employed so that each
ERP module was associated with both a functional and a technical team. Members of these teams were staffed largely with
ABC central administrative management, whose positions were to varying degrees back-filled for the duration of the
initiative. Vendor representatives, software contractors, and management consultants were also assigned to the larger
project team. User participation was sought from diverse populations on campus and representatives from departmental
units were involved including several ‘super-users’, line level employees, and low- to middle-management. Yet in spite of
the project team’s attempt to involve faculty, they failed to show interest in the administrative IT project.
Traditionally, there had been a lack of mutual understanding between academic departments and those working in central
administration. Central staff complained that, while their work was intended to help the University as a whole, the
academic constituencies did not value rigorous administrative practices. Faculty argued that administration charged them
close to 30 percent in indirect costs for every research dollar they brought into the organization, and for that price Central
should take the brunt of the administrative effort. With the inception of the ERP initiative, the newly formed project team was
aware that academic constituencies would be affected because the design of the software would require faculty and their
staff to work differently. In particular, the ERP supported an integrated financial management and budgeting approach that
would assist in rolling-up departmental information into a University-wide corporate budget. This approach—time-phased
budgeting— was expected to professionalize accounting and budgeting by moving the academic enterprise out of its adhoc legacy ‘commitment accounting’ environment. The project team tried to garner faculty support from the beginning of
the project and worked hard to keep them informed of the changes that were being made to administrative practice:

…Particularly working with the faculty and trying to figure out how to keep them up to speed and
interested in what we were doing, was decidedly less successful. That was, super challenging—maybe it
was us—I mean maybe we just didn’t focus enough time and attention in trying to figure out exactly what
they would want and need and how to keep them excited throughout the process. I’m not sure. But we
did have a couple of attempts at committees, to bring people on committees and it really…was not…a
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very successful process…they weren’t interested during the project but they certainly are interested now.
[ABC Leader]
Members of the project team, on the other hand, were becoming deeply invested in configuring the ERP in a manner that
was commensurate with their centralized approach to administration.
Those super-users from departments whose perspectives were at odds with the centralized approach found themselves
swayed by the conceptual ideas that underpinned the proposed tighter coupling of practices:

Everyone was talking about how [the vendor] was going to allow us to be more professional in terms of
finances and the concepts sounded great and made sense to me [Super-user project member]

The project team felt as though everyone was in agreement with the proposed configuration because no one stated
otherwise:

We are doing great, everyone is on-board with the proposed changes. I mean, they know it’s going to be
a lot of work in the beginning but the community is on the same page. [Change manager]

The change manager held weekly sessions with the user community in an attempt to elicit feedback and communicate
project news.
In addition, ABC’s VP for Administration, who was the project’s champion, advocated user participation throughout the
duration of the initiative in order to improve the likelihood of user acceptance at installation. He ensured adequate funding
for back filling positions and encouraged input from the wider community. These efforts were only partially successful:

…Most people were not particularly interested in the details of the implementation and that’s what you
end up spending most of your time and effort worrying about…I mean, some people were very nice and
very co-operative and came to all the meetings and sat there and would occasionally ask questions and
tried to act interested. But I really don’t think, even the few people who we had involved in committee
efforts and the project team part time, my sense was that they were not really heavily engaged in the
process…as long as they got the system they wanted at the end, that’s all they much cared about it. [ABC
Leader]

As a result, the project team configured and implemented the modules to reflect their preferred central administrative
perspective to financial management.

Participation during Post-Implementation
At installation, however, the wider ABC community refused to work with the financial management module. The
unfamiliarity with the ERP technology itself and the necessary learning curve that is a part of all post-implementation phases
of development only partially explained user resistance. The user community, who had expected a ‘reduction in hassle
factor’ as a result of the new system, felt that their needs had not been met.

Why has central management become invested in changing, for an extremely large revenue stream, from
a tried-and-true system, proven to be both efficient and well-accepted by the faculty, to one that has not
been tested with these types of accounts, and is less efficient and useful for the faculty? My guess is that
there is too much water under the bridge to go back. [Academic user]

During the post implementation phase faculty formed a coalition and demanded a series of meetings with the provost,
where, along with their staff and key project leaders, they expressed their feeling that the project had failed to meet the
needs of the academic community. The provost mandated the project team to work with the academic constituencies on
modifying the ERP in order to stave off their rejection of the system. This, coupled with academic interest in the post
implementation phase, meant that rather than winding down the project infrastructure, it remained fully ramped up and
staffed for the first year.
The project team negotiated with faculty to find a workable solution for everyone that involved making sufficient
modifications to the ERP and the accompanying business processes. One project member who was seen to have strong
skills communicating between central administration and the academic constituencies was assigned to work closely with
faculty one-on-one in the post implementation environment:

[Faculty] are receptive to the new reports which have more of the commitment accounting concepts that
they are familiar with…The faculty are never going to use time-phased budgeting, why are we working so
hard to change the culture?…[A leader on the finance team] says we need to either change the culture to
fit the approach or change the approach to fit the culture and now she thinks that maybe we shouldn’t
really work to change the culture. One way or the other we need to get faculty on board.
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Interestingly, post-implementation interviews with several project leaders indicated that they believed these negotiations with
faculty existed only because the project team was inexperienced and had somehow failed to do it right:

I’m devastated, we tried so hard and everyone was all smiles and going about their business and now they
are out with the daggers, it’s as if the past three years of my life are being challenged and I’m told that I’m
a failure because the departments all of a sudden hate what they seemed to be ok with before. [Project
Team Member]

They argued that if they were to embark on another ERP project user resistance would not happen:

[Project leader] says she feels as though they struggled so much because it was new to them and that the
upgrade to the [next version of vendor’s product] will go a lot more smoothly because of the critical
success factors they learned about from the first implementation. She felt strongly that they had learned a
lot and would get users to be more readily involved in the future so that they would avoid postimplementation problems. [Field researcher’s pre-interview notes]

Furthermore, ABC lost a significant amount of project expertise during the post-implementation phase. Several university
leaders, including the VP, left within the first year after installation, and project members were hired away by the external
groups who were consulting on the project. Yet despite these human resource changes, the project team succeeded in
creating customizations to the ERP and modifying business processes enough to bring the academic enterprise into the ERP
environment.

Analysis
While we recognize the benefits of user participation as advocated by Enid Mumford, we argue that the increasing
popularity of buying rather than building systems today requires an elaboration of the concept, as we attempt in this analysis.
Our main point is to stress the reality of ES implementation projects as inevitably highly iterative, with organizations (and
groups) gradually learning to exploit the functionality of this powerful type of integrative software package through situated
learning in use. During cycles of configuration/customization and implementation/use, organizations are gradually able to
exploit ES functionality. Companies should not see the first cycle as the end-point because, during post-implementation use,
individuals are much more likely to be able to learn how to subsequently configure/customize to maximize future use. Our
analysis indicates that user participation is as important, if not more, in the post-implementation period as in preceding
periods, a point that seems to be ignored in much of the literature on user participation as well as the resource allocation
model used by organizations in practice, both of which stress the importance of user participation during the pre- rather
than post-implementation phase.

Limits to User Participation during the Initial Phase
Our case data indicate that there are limits to user participation during the initial configuration/customization phase.
Legacy thinking
Evidence from both cases suggests that users found it difficult during the early stages of requirements definition to see
beyond their current practices and anticipate how things could be done differently if they had new tools to enable more
integration within and across functions. This is because much work practice is rooted in everyday interactions (Suchman,
1987) so that trying to appreciate a new way of working by just looking at the technical system is difficult. Add this to the
users’ limited technical knowledge (Beath and Orlikowski, 1994) and it becomes understandable why, when users are
involved in the configuration/customization phase, their main concern is that the new system will enable them to do what
they did before— with ‘as little change as possible’. Arguably, given such legacy thinking, user involvement during the
design stage can actually restrict the potential for the new system to be used in transforming ways. In the XYZ case, this
legacy thinking significantly delayed the implementation of the marketing and sales modules because the user
representatives would not compromise on their existing practices. Here, these users had significant power in the
organization and so were able to stall the project; a situation that many user groups will not enjoy (Howcroft and Wilson,
2003).
This problem is not traditionally experienced in software development because bespoke software is being developed
specifically to support organizational processes (even if these have been previously reengineered). This highlights a key
difference between the traditional and packaged IS development lifecycle and the implications for user participation.
Vanilla Implementation
Since the option to purchase software was first recognized in the literature so too was the question raised as to whether one
should implement an unmodified (vanilla) package, or enhance and customize the purchased package (Rands, 1992).
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While the new generation ES packages do allow configuration options, the general advice from software companies and
consultants is to avoid, as far as possible, customizations to the package, and so go for a vanilla implementation. This was
certainly the strategy followed by XYZ, where the user participation was consultative (Mumford, 1983b) in nature and met
the intelligence function of project management, who sought to learn about the local environment and minimize changes to
the software (Kawalek and Wood-Harper, 2002). At ABC, they were combining modules from existing ES products to create
a university-friendly suite. To this end, ABC did employ consultative and representative participation, seeking to gather
intelligence regarding higher education work practices from University representatives in order to determine the essential
modifications to their existing, public sector software package. However, the vendor made it clear that the relatively small
market size of the university sector meant that a return on investment required as few alterations to their existing product as
possible.
Given this context, one wonders what the point of user involvement is if users are not listened to because of the desire for a
vanilla implementation. For example, in the XYZ case, the call center users requested 600 customizations to the standard
package but were only allowed eight of these in the first release of the software. One can anticipate that involving users but
then ignoring their requests is unlikely to foster trust and confidence, ingredients recognized as essential for effective
participation by the situated learning school (Wenger, 1998). Instead, it may actually create frustration and resentment,
thus eliminating one of the primary goals of participation, to reduce user resistance (Wong and Tate, 1994). In the
instances where vanilla implementation is a project goal, user participation beyond the consultative level during the
configuration/customization phase might in some circumstances be counter-productive. Of course, such a problem would
not surface during traditional IS development.
Motivation
A final problem observed in the cases during this pre-implementation phase was actually getting users to be interested in
participation throughout the initiatives. This was particularly the case in ABC, where representative participation existed
through the involvement of super-users whose primary positions were back-filled. Notwithstanding, faculty and the wider
user community did not take much notice of the ES being developed, despite the fact that they were regularly invited to
attend update meetings. Furthermore, super-users were unable to recognize how the ES financial module’s configuration
would adversely affect academic constituencies, a fact that would be anticipated from a situated learning perspective (Lave
and Wenger, 1991). Similarly, in the XYZ case, the core team commented on how users were not really interested until they
could actually see a working version of the new system and then really appreciate how it was going to affect their work
practice.
We argue that, rather than being a shortcoming of the participative approach, the lack of engagement is a reflection of
human nature, as depicted by the situated learning school, where we only become interested in something when it is salient
to us and when we can actually begin to learn about the technology through practice and participation (Wenger, 1998).
Even genuine attempts made by the users to be involved will fall short because of more pressing matters that are in front of
them at the time (Wagner and Piccoli, forthcoming). As our case evidence indicates, even when the precept of early user
participation is followed, as was the case at both ABC and XYZ, users who are busy at work will have their attention
captured by immediate responsibilities and the project will remain low in salience, failing to fully engage user attention.
This was the case with ABC faculty who became committed to the ES project only when their sphere of work was directly
impacted. This is in part due to legacy thinking (see above); it takes significant cognitive effort to envision how the final
system will operate and change work practice. In addition, a temporal element needs to be considered, involving
examining how closely the information given impacts daily life. According to elaboration likelihood (Petty and Cacioppo,
1986), individuals have to be both motivated and able to process information in order for it to become salient and move
them into action. Thus, when project completion is imminent and the reality of new work practices becomes apparent, users
begin to evaluate the new system more closely and raise significant issues, often leading to user resistance and the need for
post-implementation modifications.
Importantly, project staff at ABC interpreted the lack of engagement and dissent as indicative of user support. The change
manager felt that the team was “doing great”. We come to see later that users were in fact not on-board and were merely
acting “as-if” they trusted the project team to deliver an appropriate system because of the project’s lack of salience for
them. According to Wynne (1996) “as-if” trust exists in risky environments because there seems to be no other plausible
choice.
On the other hand, in XYZ, the problem was that call-center users were motivated and suggested changes to the standard
configuration, but these were mostly ignored because of the desire to install a vanilla system. Both the as-if trust in ABC and
the ignoring of users in XYZ can be seen as examples of pseudo participation (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995). The latter can
be referred to as top-down pseudo participation, where managers attempt to involve users while controlling all the decisions
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because of their power (Howcroft and Wilson, 2003). However, our findings suggest that users may also be described as
showing only pseudo participation, albeit for different reasons. We can refer to this as bottom-up pseudo participation.
Interestingly, the former type of pseudo participation was more evident in XYZ, while the latter was more pronounced in
ABC. This is probably a reflection of the difference between organizational forms where the loosely coupled university
environment retains distributed power and autonomy with faculty who do not feel compelled to participate until their
domain and work practice is directly impacted. Conversely, the structure of global corporations tends to require more
traditional reporting and communication structures that enable management directives. Moreover, the bottom-up pseudo
participation in ABC meant that resistance did not occur until the post-implementation phase, while in XYZ the top-down
pseudo participation led to resistance during the configuration/customization phase among those groups that had the
power to resist. For this reason, the project implementation was stalled in certain modules at XYZ until customizations were
made that users demanded. In ABC, the implementation was not stalled, but users refused to use the implemented system
until customizations had been made. In both cases, therefore, this pseudo participation led to project delays.

Opportunities for User Participation in the Post-Implementation Environment
Given these difficulties of user participation in this initial configuration/customization phase, we suggest that organizations
should consider carefully how users may be encouraged to participate in the post-implementation environment. If we take
the notions of salience during situated learning as our point of departure with regard to the engagement of human
resources during ES projects, then the framework for effective user participation changes. Take, for example, a key issue
that was apparent from the two cases the iterative nature of an ES implementation. Modifications occurred in the postimplementation period, when users finally became engaged in making the software work for them in the context of their
everyday situated learning from practice. Thus, in ABC, it was during the post-implementation phase of the ES project that
previously silent users expressed their dissatisfaction with the system. This is demonstrated most effectively with the example
of faculty concerns about the financial management of their grant accounts. At this point, faculty and their staff became
angry with the project team’s choice to exclude legacy functionality in a manner that they interpreted as underhanded.
While evidence does suggest that the project team was motivated to shift the ways in which faculty and their staff report on
grant dollars, the quotations illustrate the emergent and situated nature of engagement where faculty and their staff became
concerned about the ES design when previously they had not been engaged. Similarly, quotations from the XYZ case
emphasize how, when users actually started to work with the system, they came to appreciate the advantages and the
limitations of the system as provided and so demanded changes and/or learned to exploit its functionality as they
participated in and learned from their everyday routines.
This leads us to question high levels of continuous user participation throughout the duration of the initiative, especially
when consensus is so difficult to achieve, given the political nature of organizations (Howcroft and Wilson, 2003).
Furthermore, the ‘whole house’ scope of ES implementations means that consensus participation (Mumford, 1983b) would
require an unwieldy amount of user participation during pre-implementation. Given the integrated nature of an ES,
involving users from all the different areas is likely to lead to a situation where agreement is difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve. Different groups will want different things included/excluded and if consensus is sought, this is likely to lead to a
stalemate (Wagner and Newell, 2006), as in the marketing and sales deployments at XYZ. Or, it may lead to the
development of a configuration that is initially seen to be perfect and yet falls apart in use. The issue here is that users (and
designers) are attempting to create an IS that suits current demands, but ignore the fact that demands change rapidly today
and/or that once a system is in use, users will in any case adapt/modify and develop work arounds so that, through a
process of situated learning, any system will change from its intended use pattern (Orlikowski, 1996; Suchman, 1987).
Therefore, it may be more advantageous both in terms of resource time and eventual buy-in to find out how the basic
system is used before deciding what customizations are going to add real value, beyond those that are initially agreed to be
essential to accommodate unique organizational nomenclature.
Prototyping and iterative approaches to software development were developed for bespoken software design. We now can
ask what prototyping means in the context of packaged software implementation and whether the distinction between a
prototype and a working system (Dearnley and Mayhew, 1983) continues to be helpful. Quite relevant for today’s packaged
software environment is Dearnley and Mayhew’s statement that the prototype should be “simple and relatively quick to
create, amend and rebuild” (41), reminding us of the role for vanilla ES implementations, with the vanilla version being
seen as a prototype that might subsequently require modification. Further, it has been pointed out that prototyping might
be more than just the basis for the analysis/requirements phase of IS development: it might evolve into the operational
system itself. From this perspective, the prototype is a system ‘in use’ (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995) that will continue to
evolve as the organization does. This is in keeping with the idea of growth and emergence as opposed to design (Truex,
Baskerville and Klein, 1999), where user acceptance will never be complete because organizations are constantly changing.
As such, IS development needs to be seen as a continuous process of evolution with no final design being possible or
warranted. User participation from this perspective may not be constrained to the pre-implementation phase but may also
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be considered in the context of use, both in terms of informal learning and improvisation (Orliskowski, 1996) but also in
terms of formal processes of continuous and iterative IS development. Consultancy providers have recognized the potential
of such post implementation adaptation as evidenced by the substantial and growing consultancy business focused on this.
The effectiveness of such services, however, has not received research attention, and while our research highlights why such
services are necessary, further research is needed to identify whether and how such consultancy provision can be effective.
At the other end of the iterative life-cycle of development, Dearnley and Mayhew (1985) posed a call for research
investigating the optimal time to build the first prototype and our study seeks to contribute to this question. During the cycles
of configuration/customization and use, the reality of the new system certainly becomes salient and users will inevitably
become more interested as they begin to learn from their situated practice. Indeed, we would argue that it is at this point
that users might move from being involved to engaged in the ES implementation project because once their work practice is
being impacted, prototyping will be most effective. Most importantly, it is during these iterations that they will really look at
what the new system offers and be concerned about whether it makes their job easier or more difficult. Where the new
system is seen to make their job difficult, as in the ABC case, there will be significant user resistance. Attempting to get users
to appreciate and use all the potential functionality of the new system appears to be a mistaken or unrealistic target. Rather,
a more realistic goal appears to be to provide users with a system that makes their jobs not significantly more difficult and at
the same time provides them with the prospect that they will be able to do even more in the future. This incremental or
piecemeal approach to ES implementation (Robey et al., 2002) has been criticized because, in the post-implementation
environment, resources are not typically provided to source the effort that is required to continue the development process.
However, we argue that this is a matter of planning for resources to be available in the post-implementation environment,
rather than a fundamental problem with the piecemeal approach. Indeed, we would argue, based on our cases, that such
an approach is likely to be more realistic and more successful, provided that these resources can be made available. Thus,
our two themes for post-implementation user participation are that organizations can think selectively about when to
engage users and that they can set aside resources for this phase of the ES lifecycle, not expecting the
configuration/customization phase to be a one-off, initial phase.

Selective Engagement
We argue that in the post implementation environment, one is better equipped to engage users effectively. This does not
necessarily imply that users should not be engaged in consultative participation during the initial configuration/customization
phase of the implementation since this is in any case likely to be both politically important and necessary for the intelligence
function of the project team (Kawalek and Wood-Harper, 2002). What it does mean is that there are limits to user
participation in the early stages of an ES implementation, as discussed above, while once they have to actually use the
system and begin to learn about its advantages and limitations from their situated practice, they are much more likely to
want and be able to have their voices heard. At first consideration, thinking about involving users after installation of the
software seems unrealistic and expensive, but we introduce the notion of selective engagement as an additional form of
participation that would augment the existing levels of participation (Dearnley and Mayhew, 1983; Avison and Fitzgerald,
1995; Mumford, 1983b). We argue that engaging users selectively in the post-implementation use phase is likely to be
particularly important and productive in terms of creating a viable IS.
Others have shown that analysts don’t do a good job of hearing users during requirements definition (Alvarez and Urla,
2002). This is in part due to the storytelling approach users adopt when talking about their requirements, where they share
stories about their current activities and point out limitations, challenges, and highlights of their business practices. This is a
reflection of the situated embeddedness of everyday work practices (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). However,
analysts discount this information as superfluous and become frustrated when users cannot list their requirements in a more
linear, rule-based manner. Analysts fail to recognize the extent to which rules of action do not proscribe practice, since
each episode of action is unique and in some way dependent on the meaning that actors determine, rather than on predefined causal connections (Garfinkel, 1986).
Despite the wisdom of conceptual modeling such as soft systems methodology (Checkland, 1981) as an aid in information
requirements determination (c.f. Galliers, 1987), many analysts still discount these stories during pre-implementation. We
argue that it is easier to hear the users when there are tangible products/processes/functions to refer back to and users are
working in the new environment, as in the ABC case when the problems associated with the lack of legacy accounting
functionality became clearly communicated. Once faculty were actually working with the new ES they could better describe
how it was limiting (or enhancing) the ways in which they conducted their activities. If users have migrated to the ES
environment, they will likely tell stories about their experiences in that environment and highlight what they feel is lacking
both in terms of what they used to have and new functionality that might be incomplete. This is not to argue that
requirements definition should be avoided during the initial configuration/customization phase. Indeed, this is necessary,
both in terms of facilitating users to move away from legacy thinking and the political necessities associated with system
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ownership. Rather, this is to say that sticking more closely to the vanilla implementation may be preferable—as long as key
actors are willing to engage selectively in the post implementation engagement. Doing so will highlight that which is nonnegotiable from the users' perspective and that which is not.
Determining non-negotiable requests is much easier in the post-implementation environment when users will highlight that
which is most likely to lead to a rejection of the system, as in the ABC case. The power of an implemented system is not to
be underestimated in terms of persuading users to make it work. As has been indicated elsewhere (Wagner and Newell,
2006), attempts to achieve consensus about development on an integrated software project can consume considerable
resources without knowing for sure which issues are necessary for success and which are negotiable. This leads us to the
theme of resource allocation.

Resource Allocation
User acceptance is seen to be the number one critical success factor for software projects, and user participation can help
to achieve this (Davis and Olsen, 1985; Mumford and Weir, 1979; Mumford, 1983b, 1995, 2000). Moreover, user
participation continues to be seen as critical in relation to ES implementation success (Holland and Light, 1999; Markus et
al., 2000; Nah et al., 2001; Nah et al., 2003; Parr et al., 1999; Rosario, 2000; Sumner, 2000). However, with the high
rate of ES failure, more must be done. While considerable resources are being spent, pitfalls continue to be encountered.
Engagement emerges over time as users learn from their situated practice, and the needs of different groups must be
addressed at that time—even where a concerted effort has been made to encourage user participation from the outset. In
XYZ, marketing users demanded changes prior to implementation, stalling the project, but in all modules staff made
customization requests in the post-implementation environment once they recognized the limits of the system. In ABC,
demands from faculty in the post-implementation phase were particularly forceful, upsetting interpersonal relationships,
increasing the project budget and delaying acceptance of the ES. Project leaders were resentful of faculty and accused
them of an 11th hour interest in the project. Faculty and their staff were shocked, on the other hand, to find that the
software did not meet their needs, and trust was damaged. As discussed above, we argue that ‘as if’ trust is a regular
feature of project work and silence should not be mistaken for compliance or relinquishment of ownership by lay persons to
the perceived expert (Wynne, 1996). Rather, we suggest participatory ES development requires project leaders to
acknowledge the dormant politics of those exhibiting as-if trust and intuit the appropriate timing for soliciting their
perspectives and garnering support.
Exploiting the functionality of an ES, or at least the functionality that is considered appropriate for the particular organization,
is likely to require both modifications to the software and to organizational structures and processes (Wagner and Newell,
2006). This suggests the need to distinguish between immediate ES installation success and long-term implementation/use
success, and to observe the influence of participation on both (Markus Tanis, 2000). Complex ES have enormous potential
functionality, which is often under-utilized in the immediate or even medium-term aftermath of a system implementation.
Wagner and Newell found that only 28 percent of organizations that had implemented an ES had fully deployed the
package. Yet, only a small minority (6.5 percent) had failed to deploy, leaving the majority who had deployed with limited
exploitation of the functionality. This suggests that efforts in the post-implementation period would be useful in gradually
increasing the amount of functionality deployed. The importance of acknowledging timing with regard to ES initiatives is that
resources need to be made available in the post-implementation environment to support user participation in a more
structured and strategic way than is common currently.

Conclusions
ES are sold by vendors as ‘best practice solutions’ so one would expect that these packages would be relatively easy to
implement and use. Our cases confirm that this is, in reality, far from being the case. Ironically, it could be argued that
vendors already recognize this, albeit covertly, in the sense that they support the need for adopting organizations to use
consultancy services; indeed they themselves often sell their own consultancy services. In other words, vendors recognize
that most organizations are going to require considerable external consultancy support to tailor or customize this supposedly
ready-made solution for the particular organization, or to adapt their organization to fit the vanilla system. In some ways this
is like selling a ready-made meal that still requires a professional cook to assemble the dish. Our conclusions are therefore
based on what is actually happening in practice; despite the rhetoric about “best-practice” our results support the idea that
what is best will always be contingent on particular organizational circumstances. Trying to figure out what is best from the
packaged software and best from existing practice is going to be an iterative process that is unlikely to be easily worked
through in advance of actual implementation and use. This is because users themselves need to participate in this decision
process and for a number of reasons – legacy thinking, bottom-up or top-down pseudo participation, motivation – this
participation is going to be limited prior to actual implementation and situated learning through use. We therefore advocate
seeing an ES in terms of an iterative experience lifecycle where phases of configuration/customization and
implementation/use will alternate cyclically, gradually helping to exploit the functionality of the software. Indeed, this might
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require a wholesale change in our thinking about organizations and systems development, where the former is seen as an
emergent form (Truex, Baskerville and Klein, 1999) and the prototype is the means for accommodating the evolution, with
the prototype installed as a system ‘in use’ (Dearnley and Mayhew, 1983; Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995).
Getting users to buy in to the final product and empowering them to take an active role in their work lives are goals of
participation efforts (Mumford, 1983b, c). We argue that post implementation engagement is an effective way of garnering
user interest and assistance, at least with respect to an ES. Given that participation is more beneficial in the postimplementation phases of the project, we argue for resources to be provided to enable this to take place. In addition,
budgeting for post implementation work efforts can aid in resource-intensive activities like data cleaning. Of course, prior
to go-live, it is important to try and clean up the data from legacy systems in order, for example, to avoid duplication of
records. However, it is likely to be impossible or at least extremely time-consuming to get the data completely clean. As
users actually use the system, they will be more focused and able, iteratively, to pick it up and rectify any problems with the
data in order to gradually improve the database that everyone is working with.
Given this iterative cycle of ES exploitation in the post-implementation period, finding ways to speed up and more effectively
facilitate this iteration through user participation would seem to be a significant opportunity for organizations. The problem
is that if the importance of this post-implementation user participation is not legitimized, it is likely to be less effective and
exploitation will be slower (just as post-build additions to one’s house often get postponed) although adaptations will
eventually happen. This post-implementation is particularly problematic in an ES implementation because members of the
core project team who could usefully facilitate user participation during this period may not be available. This may be for a
number of reasons – because the team has been disbanded, or because team members have left to take advantage of their
ES implementation experience, or simply because, given the long duration of many ES projects, the project team is burnt out.
This indicates the importance of developing a strategic plan to encourage user participation during this post-implementation
period.
In sum, we call for a reorientation with regard to the role and timing of user participation on ES projects. Postimplementation engagement should be part of the project plan and adequate resources reserved and retained. We argue
that ES initiative projects do not, and should not, wind down at go-live. No longer is it appropriate to have organizations
interpreting post-implementation changes as an indication of a failure. As shown in the ABC data, project members were
devastated by the seeming change of heart of the academic community and felt they could do better the next time. This
sense of not having done well enough but being able to do better next time is, we argue, like seeing the pot of gold at the
end of a rainbow. The notion of situated learning teaches us that meaningful engagement prior to go-live is limited. Rather
than perpetuating this belief, we call for an extension of user participation activities to reflect post-implementation
modifications as necessary and important. This is, after all, what is happening in practice.
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